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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, t 
Plaintiff-Appellee, : Case No. 900419-CA 
v. s 
WILLIAM ROBERT CUMMINS, I Category No. 2 
Defendant-Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from a conviction of second degree 
murder, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 
76-5-203 (Supp. 1990). This Court has jurisdiction to hear the 
appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) (Supp. 1990), 
because the case was transferred from the Utah Supreme Court on 
August 31, 1990. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Did defendant preserve his claim of prosecutorial 
misconduct for appellate review? Generally, a contemporaneous 
objection is required before an appellate court will review a 
claim on appeal. State v. Johnson, 774 P.2d 1141, 1144 (Utah 
1989). A motion for mistrial after the conclusion of closing 
argument does not serve as a contemporaneous objection which 
preserves an issue for review. State v. White, 577 P.2d 552, 555 
(Utah 1978). Alternatively, did the statements of the prosecutor 
constitute plain error which this Court should review in spite of 
the waiver? The two prong test of plain error is 1) whether the 
error should have been obvious to the trial court; and 2) whether 
the error was harmful. State v. Eldredge, 773 P.2d 29, 35 
(Utah), cert, denied, 110 S.Ct. 62 (1989). 
2. Did the trial court abuse its discretion by the 
manner in which a private investigator was provided for defendant 
and by denying defendant's request to appoint a psychiatrist to 
assist in his defense? A request for appointment of an 
investigator is to be addressed first to the county; if the 
county refuses to act, defendant can seek a writ of mandamus in 
court for appointment. Washington County v. Day, 22 Utah 2d 6, 
447 P.2d 189, 192 (1968). 
3. Did the trial court properly deny defendant's 
motion for continuance? The granting of a motion to continue is 
within the discretion of the trial court. State v. Creviston, 
646 P.2d 750, 752 (Utah 1982). 
4. Did trial counsel provide constitutionally 
effective assistance to defendant? To establish ineffective 
assistance of counsel, defendant must demonstrate that his 
counsel's performance was deficient and that the deficient 
performance prejudiced him. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 
668, 687 (1984). 
5. Did the trial court properly instruct and guide the 
jury as to the points of law pertinent to this case? The trial 
court has the duty to instruct the jury on the law applicable to 
the facts of the case. State v. Potter, 627 P.2d 75, 78 (Utah 
1981). The framing of instructions lies within the trial court's 
discretion. State v. Standiford, 769 P.2d 254, 266 (Utah 1988). 
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6. Did the trial court abuse its discretion by the 
manner in which it allowed the jury to conduct its deliberation? 
The length of time for jury deliberations is discretionary with 
the trial court. State v. Lactod, 761 P.2d 23, 31 (Utah Ct. App. 
1988). 
7. Did the trial court correctly refuse to allow the 
jury to view the crime scene? The decision to allow jurors to 
view a crime scene lies in the sound discretion of the trial 
court. State v. Roedl, 107 Utah 538, 155 P.2d 741, 746 (1945). 
8. Does the doctrine of cumulative error apply in this 
case? The cumulative error doctrine does not apply when no 
substantial errors were committed in the trial. State v. Rammel, 
721 P.2d 498, 501-502 (Utah 1986). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
The language of the provisions upon which the State 
relies is included in the body of this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On October 27, 1989, defendant and three co-defendants 
were charged with second degree murder, a first degree felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203 (Supp. 1990) (Record 
[hereafter R.] at 2 and 6). On November 1, 1989, defendant filed 
a motion in the circuit court for appointment of a private 
investigator to assist in preparation of his defense (R. at 14-
16). The circuit court denied that motion on November 3, 1989, 
on the basis that defendant had not complied with the procedure 
for appointment mandated in Washington County v. Day, 447 P.2d 
189 (Utah 1968) (R. at 24). 
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Counsel was appointed for defendant; defense counsel 
filed a motion for discovery on November 10, 19891 (R. at 34-
36). Preliminary hearing for the four defendants was held 
December 19, 20, 21, and 22, 1989 (R. at 73 and 78-133). The 
charge against defendant was bound over to the trial court, which 
set a scheduling conference on January 3, 1990 (R. at 135 and 
137). 
On January 10, 1990, defendant waived his right to a 
speedy trial, and trial was set for February 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9, 
1990. All motions were to be filed by January 12, and a 
transcript of the preliminary hearing was to be provided to 
counsel as soon as possible (R. at 141) • Also on January 10, 
counsel for this defendant filed a motion to continue the trial, 
claiming that discovery had not been completed and that the 
private investigator (which evidently had been provided by that 
time) and counsel needed more time to investigate and prepare for 
trial (R. at 146-48). The motion was denied on the grounds, 
inter alia, that there had been an extensive preliminary hearing, 
that defendants were in custody, and that the witnesses were 
transient and their continued presence to testify might be 
jeopardized by a continuance (R. at 156-57). On January 16, 
1990, defendant filed an objection to the trial setting (R. at 
183). 
1
 The motion appears to have been signed on October 10; 
however, the crime did not occur until October 25. The order 
granting the motion was signed by the court on November 13. 
Apparently, the typewritten month on counsel's signature line is 
in error; the typewritten month in the certificate of mailing was 
corrected. 
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Defendant filed a motion on January 16, 1990, to allow 
psychological testing and evaluation regarding his ability to 
form the intent required for second degree murder (R. at 185)• 
That same day, he filed a motion for appointment of a 
psychiatrist to determine if he "had the capacity to form the 
necessary intent", a toxicologist to determine the amount of 
marijuana present in the victim's blood, an expert to determine 
defendant's blood alcohol content, and a doctor to assist in 
interpreting the medical examiner's report (R. at 187-88). 
Several other documents were also filed that day, including a 
notice of intent to claim lack of capacity to form intent (R. at 
189-200). 
At hearings held on January 18, 1990, defendant argued 
that the jury should be transported to the crime scene to view it 
(Transcript of hearing 1/18/90 involving defendant and co-
defendant Cabututan at 3-4). This motion was denied (R. at 236-
38). On January 19, 1990, the court granted defendant's motion 
for expert testimony regarding defendant's level of intoxication 
and the effects thereof, even though the court noted that it was 
filed untimely (R. at 239-40). 
The matter came on for jury trial on February 5, 6, 7, 
8, and 9, 1990, in the First Judicial District Court, in and for 
Box Elder County, State of Utah, with the Honorable F. L. 
Gunnell, district judge, presiding (R. at 294-98). At the 
conclusion of trial, the jury found defendant guilty as charged 
(R. at 298 and 368-69). On February 20, 1990, the court 
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sentenced defendant to a term of five years to life in the Utah 
State Prison (R. at 293 and 370-72). 
After trial, counsel filed a notice of appeal, and 
defendant sent a pro se request to the trial court asking that 
substitute counsel be appointed to pursue his appeal (R. at 375 
and 394). On August 10, 1990, the court appointed substitute 
appellate counsel for defendant (R. at 407). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
In October of 1989, the Western Brine Shrimp Company 
had established a camp for its workers on the west side of the 
Great Salt Lake, in the Hogups area at Fingerpoint (Transcript of 
trial [hereafter Tr.] at 454 and 112). There were three small 
living trailers at the camp which were numbered from one to three 
(north to south) for purposes of trial (Tr. at 74). Richard 
Anderson, Eric Tilley, and Sherman Galardo lived in trailer #1 
(Tr. at 112). Eddie Apodaca, Ray Cabututan, and Michael or 
Miguel Ramirez stayed in trailer #2 (R. at 86-87). Defendant 
stayed in trailer #3 with Billy Cayer and Don Brown (Tr. at 87 
and 455). 
On October 25, 1989, Eddie Apodaca and Richard Anderson 
spent the day building an outhouse north of the camp (Tr. at 85). 
Apodaca had worked at the camp for a couple of months prior to 
that day; Anderson had worked there four or five weeks (Tr. at 85 
and 111). Defendant and Cayer had worked at the camp for 
approximately two months (Tr. at 455). Ramirez had worked there 
for two days (Tr. at 457). On October 25, Don Brown spoke with 
defendant about purchasing alcohol or drugs while Brown was in 
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Salt Lake City, delivering shrimp eggs (Tr. at 457). Defendant 
asked Brown to bring him a half gallon of Jack Daniels whiskey 
(Tr. at 458). 
When Brown returned to the camp at approximately 7:30 
p.m., he brought a 12-pack of beer with six beers missing, a half 
gallon of vodka, and a half gallon of whiskey (Tr. at 459-60). 
Even though there was a rule against alcohol in the camp, 
defendant and some of the others began drinking (Tr. at 460-69). 
At approximately 9:00 p.m., Betty Bentzley, one of the owners of 
the brine shrimp company, radioed the camp to check on the 
workers. Defendant answered the radio and spoke with Ms. 
Bentzley, assuring her that everything was fine at the camp, that 
all the men were in the trailers, and that no one was drinking 
(Tr. at 442). Ms. Bentzley only asked whether anyone was 
drinking as a joke; nothing about defendant's voice made her 
suspicious that he was drinking (Tr. at 443). 
It was dark at 9:45 p.m. when defendant approached the 
second trailer and asked Apodaca to go with him back to trailer 
#3 (Tr. at 87-88). Defendant had heard that Apodaca had 
marijuana and defendant wanted to offer Apodaca alcohol in 
exchange for marijuana (Tr. at 466). The victim, Mike Ramirez, 
who was in trailer #2 when defendant approached Apodaca, asked 
Apodaca if he wanted to borrow Ramirez's knife. Apodaca thought 
he would not need it and walked over to trailer #3. Defendant, 
Brown, Cayer, and Cabututan were drinking and talking together in 
trailer #3 when Apodaca entered (Tr. at 89). The four men were 
drinking alcoholic beverages and defendant gave Apodaca a "sip" 
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of a mixture of kool-aid and vodka (Tr. at 90-91 and 465-67 )• 
Apodaca was accused of usurping the foreman's authority and of 
not helping Cabututan, and a "scuffle" ensued (Tr. at 90-91). 
Cabututan hit Apodaca a couple of times and knocked him back on 
the bed; he then hit Apodaca on the head with a sharpening stone. 
When Cabututan reached for a broom, Apodaca ran out the door of 
the trailer. As he left trailer #3, the victim, Ramirez, stepped 
out of trailer #2 (Tr. at 91). 
Apodaca and Ramirez entered trailer #2, where Apodaca 
changed his clothes. He "didn't want to hang around, something 
might happen." Meanwhile, defendant, Brown, Cayer, and Cabututan 
broke into the trailer; Cabututan was carrying a pair of 
nunchukas (Tr. at 92-93). Ramirez stepped between the four and 
Apodaca, "trying to hold them back." Defendant told the others 
that Ramirez had a knife in his back pocket and the four of them 
backed Ramirez up between the beds in the trailer. At that 
point, Ramirez pulled out his knife and Brown also pulled a knife 
(Tr. at 94). Brown talked Ramirez into dropping his knife; then 
the three of the men grabbed Ramirez and dragged him from the 
trailer (Tr. at 95-96). Cayer, who was intoxicated, stayed in 
the trailer, hitting and kicking Apodaca. Apodaca could hear 
Ramirez being beaten (Tr. at 96-97). 
After a few minutes, Brown returned to the trailer, 
told Cayer to stop hitting Apodaca, and told Apodaca to get his 
things and leave the camp. Apodaca gathered some belongings and 
left the trailer (Tr. at 96). Outside, he saw Ramirez lying on 
the ground and "a blur of people standing around him, kicking 
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him" (Tr. at 97). Apodaca started to run away between two of the 
trailers when defendant asked him if he was not going to stay and 
help his buddy. Apodaca stopped, and as he turned around, 
defendant hit him in the jaw, knocking him to the ground (Tr. at 
97-98). From the ground, Apodaca looked under the trailer and 
saw Ramirez lying on the ground (Tr. at 98). When Apodaca stood 
up, defendant ran behind him and Cabututan came at him with a 
crescent wrench. Apodaca began running north (Tr. at 98). As he 
ran, he heard defendant tell Cabututan to let him go. Defendant 
said, "Let's finish this guy [Ramirez]" or words to that effect. 
Apodaca continued running, glancing back to see a group of people 
surrounding Ramirez who was still on the ground (Tr. at 99). 
Apodaca spent the night huddled near a bush far from the camp 
(Tr. at 100). In the morning, he walked to the road and was 
picked up by Richard Anderson and returned to the camp where the 
sheriff's deputies had arrived (Tr. at 100-101). He was dazed 
and disoriented from being struck and spending the night in the 
cold (Tr. at 105 and 244). 
Richard Anderson was in trailer #1 with Eric Tilley and 
Sherman Galardo when he heard the commotion outside the trailer. 
He got up, put on his clothes and opened the door (Tr. at 114). 
Just before he looked out, he heard someone say something like, 
"['L]eave this cam[p] before we kill you['] and [']leave this 
camp with what you got on[']" (Tr. at 115). When he looked out, 
he saw four men standing around another on the ground (Tr. at 
114-15). They were "beating on the man, kicking the man, 
whatever they could to hurt the man at the time." Defendant was 
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participating in the beating and kicking with the others (Tr. at 
116). 
The doors of trailers #1 and #2 were open, which let 
out enough light that Anderson could see what was happening. 
Anderson saw defendant, Cabututan, Brown, and Cayer pick up 
Ramirez, beat him, let him fall to the ground, and kick him. 
Ramirez pleaded for them to stop but they continued. After a few 
minutes, Cayer left but the other three continued to assault 
Ramirez (Tr. at 117). Anderson, Tilley, and Galardo did not go 
out to help Ramirez because they did not know where Cayer was and 
they felt in danger (Tr. at 118, 134 and 136). At one point, 
defendant held Ramirez up as Cabututan appeared ready to stab 
Ramirez. Galardo told Cabututan that he did not want to do that; 
Cabututan turned on Galardo. Brown raised a crescent wrench and 
swung it at Anderson, asking if he "wanted some of this, too"; 
Anderson stepped back into the trailer (Tr. at 118). 
Anderson saw defendant choking and beating Ramirez in 
the face, saying, "['Y]ou shouldn't have cut my partner Billy. 
I'm going to beat you for this.[f]" (Tr. at 119). At one point, 
someone said, "[']He's not breathing.['] And then another . . . 
voice said that, '[W]ell, things like that happen. He's just a 
spic [sic]'" (Tr. at 120). At another point, Anderson heard 
defendant say that he was going to kill Ramirez for "cutting 
[his] partner" (Tr. at 121). Defendant appeared to be doing most 
of the beating and appeared to be directing the others (Tr. at 
151-52). 
-10-
When the men stopped beating Ramirez, Ramirez got up, 
went to the water barrel, and went into his trailer to clean 
himself up. At about midnight, after things had settled down, 
Anderson looked out and saw defendant sitting on a vehicle as if 
he was watching over the camp (Tr. at 123). At about 2:30 a.m., 
Brown approached the trailer where Anderson and Galardo were and 
said, ,f[']You old boys didn't see anything last night, did 
you.['J" Anderson told him that he had not seen anything because 
Anderson feared for his life (Tr. at 122-23). Defendant and 
Brown returned to trailer #3 and sat at a table, drinking (Tr. at 
124). 
Tilley had left the trailer, carrying a steak knife and 
a sleeping bag, before Brown came to the door (Tr. at 125 and 
161). He thought it was safer to leave the camp and he spent the 
night on a plateau behind the camp (Tr. at 161). Anderson stayed 
awake all night, watching the trailer door in case any of the 
four men returned (Tr. at 125). At about 5:00 a.m., Anderson was 
sitting on the edge of his bunk when he heard a rapping at the 
door. Outside the door was Ramirez, sitting on a pallet; he 
looked up and asked Anderson to call 911 (Tr. at 125). Ramirez 
told Anderson and Galardo that he could not breathe and that he 
needed water. Galardo handed him a glass of water, which he 
drank, then he fell over backward on the pallet. Both Anderson 
and Galardo checked him for pulse and respiration; when they 
found none, Anderson and Galardo got in a truck and drove to the 
nearest telephone at Lakeside. They remained at the town until 
the Sheriff's office called and told them that the campsite was 
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secure and asked them to return (Tr. at 126). Returning to the 
campsite, they found Apodaca about ten miles from the camp, 
wandering in the desert. When they got back to the trailers, 
Anderson saw a knife next to Ramirez's body which had not been 
there when they left to telephone the authorities (Tr. at 127). 
An autopsy conducted on Ramirez's body showed "multiple 
injuries on essentially all body surfaces" (Tr. at 346). The 
cause of death was listed as multiple blunt force injuries (Tr. 
at 353). There were multiple contusions and abrasions, and 
bruising and scraping of the skin. There were stab and incise 
wounds (Tr. at 346-47). Bruising on his face and head was 
consistent with having been struck with a crescent wrench (Tr. at 
347-52). Bruising on his neck and petechiae in both eyes was 
consistent with choking and asphyxiation (Tr. at 352-53). 
Internal examination revealed that Ramirez's brain had 
swollen until it "essentially tried to push itself out of the 
bottom of the skull" (Tr. at 353). There was hemorrhaging at the 
base of the brain and in the muscles of the neck. Approximately 
a pint of blood was free in the chest cavity. There were 
multiple rib fractures, anterior and posterior and on both sides 
(Tr. at 354). The swelling of the brain was caused by blows to 
the head, choking, and an inability to inhale deeply because of 
the pain of the broken ribs (Tr. at 359-60). 
Defendant testified that he began drinking at 
approximately 8:00 p.m. on October 25, 1989 (Tr. at 460 and 499). 
First he drank a 12-ounce can of beer, then he drank a glass of 
vodka (Tr. at 461). The glass was between a third and half full, 
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which, defendant thought, was four or five ounces of alcoholic 
beverage (Tr. at 463-64). He testified that he then drank four 
or five glasses (about one-third to one-half full) of whiskey 
before he went to confront Apodaca (Tr. at 465). When Apodaca 
entered defendant's trailer, defendant gave him defendant's 
drink, then pulled out a coffee cup and filled it half full with 
whiskey (Tr. at 467-68). 
Defendant remembered the scuffle in trailer #3 between 
Apodaca and Cabututan (Tr. at 469). After Apodaca left, Cayer 
wanted to fight Cabututan, but defendant intervened. Cayer "was 
all drunk" and began "ranting and raving about something." Cayer 
"flew out the door," and Cabututan, then defendant, followed him 
(Tr. at 470). They found Cayer in trailer #2, trying to fight 
Apodaca (Tr. at 471-73). Defendant restrained Cabututan from 
using nunchukas and told Ramirez that he was going to remove 
Cayer from the trailer (Tr. at 474-75). When Brown entered the 
trailer, Brown told Ramirez to put his knife down. As Ramirez 
looked toward Brown, defendant hit Ramirez in the side of the 
face (Tr. at 475). Ramirez fell on a bunk, defendant jumped on 
him and punched him four or five more times; Ramirez had a bloody 
nose and lip. Ramirez struggled to get up and ran out the door 
(Tr. at 476). 
Defendant got Cayer out of the trailer and heard 
scuffling sounds outside (Tr. at 477-78). Apodaca came out of 
the trailer and exchanged words with defendant and defendant 
punched him (Tr. at 480). After chasing Apodaca a short 
distance, defendant walked around the trailer and saw Ramirez 
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lying face down on the ground, moaning and half conscious (Tr. at 
481-82). As defendant tried to pick him up, "someone come [sic] 
and kicked him in the face." After someone kicked Ramirez, 
defendant pushed down on him, pushing his head in the dirt and 
said, "[D]on't kick him" (Tr. at 483-84). Defendant walked 
Ramirez to his trailer and told him to lie down. Ramirez sat on 
the bed and defendant returned to his own trailer and had another 
drink (Tr. at 484). Defendant does not remember anything more 
until he awoke the next morning (Tr. at 485). He explained that 
the blood found on the clothing he had been wearing might have 
gotten there when he punched Ramirez in trailer #2 or when he 
helped Ramirez up after he had been beaten (Tr. at 486). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant did not preserve his claims of prosecutorial 
misconduct in closing argument because he did not interpose an 
objection to the comments at the time they were made. 
Alternatively, although defendant alludes to plain error, he has 
failed to fully analyze this claim under that doctrine. Even if 
the proper analysis had been made, defendant has not shown that 
the prosecutor's comments were error or that there was a 
reasonable likelihood of a different result had the statements 
been objected to and stricken. By his own testimony, defendant 
claims that he did not participate in the beating of the victim. 
The eyewitness testimony was to the contrary. These two distinct 
evidentiary options for the jury to accept decreases the 
possibility that the jury would have been influenced by the 
prosecutor's remarks. 
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The record demonstrates that defendant was provided 
with the services of an investigator long before the trial court 
actually signed an order appointing the investigator. Not only 
did defendant have the services of an investigator, he also has 
not demonstrated how an earlier appointment could have provided 
any more assistance to the preparation of his case. 
Defendant's request for appointment of a psychiatrist 
was not made in a timely fashion and the trial court properly 
denied the motion. 
Defendant has not demonstrated that he was prejudiced 
by the court's denial of his motion for continuance. Counsel had 
been on the case since defendant was first charged and had had 
two and a half months before filing his motion to prepare for 
this case. He had another twenty-five days after the motion to 
continue was denied to continue to prepare. Defendant has not 
shown that the matters he needed to review and complete could not 
have been accomplished in the time given. 
Counsel did not provide ineffective assistance by 
filing an untimely motion for appointment of a psychiatrist 
because a psychiatrist could not assist in the defense that 
defendant raised by his own testimony. Neither could a 
psychiatrist assist given the paucity of evidence of defendant's 
supposed intoxication. There is no evidence that counsel did not 
adequately prepare for trial or that his cross-examination was 
deficient. Defendant has also failed to show how a failure to 
call character witnesses prejudiced his defense. Finally, 
defendant has not alleged how counsel's failure to object to 
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prosecutorial statements in the closing argument prejudiced him; 
consequently, he has not demonstrated ineffective assistance by 
his trial counsel. 
The trial court responded to the questions submitted by 
the jury during their deliberation in an appropriate fashion when 
the court referred the jury to other instructions which would 
answer the questions they posed. 
Allowing the jury to deliberate until 1:20 a.m. was not 
coercive and did not deprive defendant of a fair trial or of due 
process. The jury did not ask to retire from deliberation and 
showed by the questions they sent out that they were giving due 
consideration to the instructions and the evidence. When the 
jury was polled after the verdict, each juror affirmed that the 
verdict was his or hers individually. Defendant has not shown 
that he was deprived of the "considered judgment of each juror." 
The jury had the benefit of diagrams and photographs of 
the crime scene; consequently, the trial court did not abuse its 
discretion in denying a motion to allow the jury to visit the 
scene. 
Because no substantial errors were made at trial, the 
doctrine of cumulative error does not apply. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
DEFENDANT DID NOT PRESERVE HIS CLAIMS OF 
PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT IN CLOSING ARGUMENT. 
WHETHER PRESERVED OR NOT, THE STATEMENTS BY 
THE PROSECUTOR DID NOT CONSTITUTE 
PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT. 
Defendant alleges that the prosecutor committed 
prejudicial error in closing argument. None of the nine specific 
instances which defendant cites as error have been preserved for 
appellate review. 
"A general rule of appellate review in 
criminal cases in Utah is that a 
contemporaneous objection or some form of 
specific preservation of claims of error must 
be made a part of the trial court record-
before an appellate court will review such 
claim on appeal." 
State v. Johnson, 774 P.2d 1141, 1144 (Utah 1989) (emphasis in 
original) (quoting State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 551 (Utah 
1987)). After closing arguments were completed, the jury retired 
to deliberate (Tr. at 669). It was not until after this point 
that defendant moved for a mistrial on the two bases that the 
prosecutor had implied that defendant and Cabututan had conspired 
to fabricate their testimonies, and that the prosecutor had 
called defendant a criminal (Tr. at 669-71).2 In State v. 
White, 577 P.2d 552 (Utah 1978), the Utah Supreme Court held that 
a motion for mistrial after the jury had retired to deliberate 
did not preserve White's claims for review. The court said: 
2
 Contrary to defendant's statement in his brief (Brief of 
Appellant [hereafter Br. of App.] at 33), the court did not deny 
the motion for mistrial and give his reasons therefor in front of 
the jury. The jury had retired when defendant made his motion 
and the judge denied it (Tr. at 669-71). 
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Defense counsel made no objection at that 
time [during the prosecutor's rebuttal], but 
after the jury had retired to deliberate, 
included that as a ground for a motion for a 
mistrial. . . . If counsel d€*sires to object 
and preserve his record as to such an error 
during argument, he must call it to the 
attention of the trial court so that if he 
thinks that it is necessary and appropriate 
to do so, he will have an opportunity to 
rectify any error or impropriety therein and 
thus obviate the necessity of an entire new 
trial. 
Id. at 555 (footnote omitted). Of the nine claims of 
prosecutorial misconduct stated by defendant, seven were never 
raised in the trial court, and two were only raised in the motion 
for mistrial after the jury had retired. For the reason of 
failure to object alone, this Court should decline to review 
defendant's claim. 
In some, but not all, of the specific claims of 
misconduct, defendant alludes to plain error; however, he 
provides little specific legal and factual analysis of the plain 
error doctrine in the specific allegations. Rule 24(a)(9), Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure (1990) requires that "th€* argument 
section of a brief 'contain the contentions of the [party] with 
respect to the issues presented and the reasons therefor, with 
citations.' . . . A brief must contain some support for each 
contention." State v. Wareham, 772 P.2d 960, 966 (Utah 1989) 
(emphasis in original). See also State v. Amicone, 689 P.2d 
1341, 1344 (Utah 1984). 
The Utah Supreme Court has recognized that lf[c]ounsel 
for both sides have 'considerably more freedom in closing 
argument' and 'a right to discuss fully from their standpoints 
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the evidence and the inferences and deductions arising 
therefrom.'" State v. Parsons, 781 P.2d 1275, 1284 (Utah 1989) 
(quoting State v. Laffertv, 749 P.2d 1239, 1255 (Utah 1988) 
(quoting State v. Valdez, 30 Utah 2d 54, 60, 513 P.2d 422, 426 
(1973)). In reviewing a claim of prosecutorial misconduct, the 
Court "must determine if the prosecutor's remarks calls [sic] to 
the attention of the jurors matters they would not be justified 
in considering in reaching the verdict and, if so whether there 
is a reasonable likelihood that the misconduct so prejudiced the 
jury that there would have been a more favorable result absent 
the misconduct.'" State v. Speer, 750 P.2d 186, 190 (Utah 1988) 
(citations omitted). Analysis of the alleged errors in closing 
argument will be conducted under the standards enunciated in 
cases of alleged prosecutorial misconduct and under the plain 
error standard. 
A. Analysis under the first prongs of the 
prosecutorial misconduct test and the plain error 
doctrine. 
In his introduction to point I, defendant cites 
generally to the two-pronged plain error test. As enunciated in 
State v. Eldredcre, 773 P.2d 29, 35 (Utah), cert, denied, 110 
S.Ct. 62 (1989), that test is 1) whether the error should have 
been obvious to the trial court; and 2) whether the error was 
harmful, i.e., whether there is a reasonable likelihood of a more 
favorable result had the error been corrected. The second prong 
is the same as the second prong of the test for prosecutorial 
misconduct stated above. 
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As noted above, defendant moved for a mistrial after 
closing argument based on two statements allegedly made* by the 
prosecutor in argument. The trial court denied the motion, 
stating that both statements were 
logically extensions of . . . the facts of 
this case. If he murdered a man, he's a 
criminal. I think the allegation is that he 
committed a murder, and I interpret the 
argument as being that for them to find that 
he is a criminal. As far as them getting 
together, they were together the whole night 
after the incident, had an opportunity to 
talk about the case. I don't know that there 
is any evidence that they did so, but 
certainly that's a reasonable inference for 
what they were doing with their time during 
that period of time and in the morning as 
well before the law enforcement people got 
there. So I just find that to be a logical 
— or an argument made from some facts that 
were before the court, so I will deny that 
motion. 
(Tr. at 671). Defendant analyzed the claim that the prosecutor 
"stigmatized'• defendant by calling him a criminal under the plain 
error test. However, he does not cite to the record for the 
alleged error, other than to defense counsel's statement in the 
motion for mistrial. Koulis v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 746 
P.2d 1182, 1184-85 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) (quoting Uckerman v. 
Lincoln Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 588 P.2d 142, 144 (Utah 1978)) 
("This Court need not, and will not, consider any facts not 
properly cited to, or supported by the record"). This Court 
should decline to consider this claim because of defendant's 
failure to cite to the record, as well as his failure to object. 
Defendant next claims error because the prosecutor 
implied that defendant and Cabututan had "[c]onspired [t]o 
[f]abricate" their testimony (Br. of App. at 35). Defendant 
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argues that when the remarks regarding this issue were made "the 
trial court should have, at a minimum, immediately sustained an 
objection" (Br. of App. at 36). However, defense counsel did not 
interpose an objection; consequently, the court could not sustain 
one (Tr. at 628-35). Defendant does not analyze this claim as 
plain error and this Court should decline to review it. 
Defendant alleges that the prosecutor expressed his 
opinion that defendant was not telling the truth, and that the 
error in that argument should have been obvious to the trial 
court. Defendant does not analyze the second prong of the plain 
error test. While it may be improper for a prosecutor to express 
his personal belief or opinion of the truthfulness of testimony, 
LaFave, Criminal Procedure, § 23.5(b) at 34 (1984), defendant 
must demonstrate a reasonable likelihood of a different result 
had the statements not been made. This prong of the test will be 
addressed further in subpoint B. 
The next claim is that the prosecutor erred in 
informing the jury that Cabututan had been convicted of second 
degree murder in his own trial. Cabututan did not testify at 
defendant's trial; as an unavailable witness, his testimony from 
the preliminary hearing was read into the record (Tr. at 575-
613)* As with any other witness, Cabututan could be and was 
impeached by his felony conviction. Rule 609(a), Utah Rules of 
Evidence. In closing, the prosecutor referred to Cabututan's 
conviction, not "as proof of Appellant's guilt" (Br. of App. at 
39), but in terms of Cabututan's credibility and motive to be 
untruthful (Tr. at 634-35). This was proper comment on 
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Cabututan's impeachment by his felony conviction; it was not 
error. 
Defendant next complains that the prosecutor 
erroneously compared the evidence in defendant's case with other 
cases. His only legal analysis is a reference to "the Miranda 
court" with no citation to that case. Without telling this Court 
what specific Miranda case he is referring to, defendant equates 
the prosecutor's comments in the present case with "similar 
comments . . . alluding to the fact that the co-defendant had 
been convicted on much weaker evidence than the evidence 
introduced against defendant" (Br. of App. at 41). Whatever case 
defendant is referring to, it clearly is not on point with the 
present case. The case referred to involved statements about a 
co-defendant being convicted on weaker evidence. The 
prosecutor's comment in the present case did not compare this 
case with the trials of the co-defendants; the comment merely 
stated that the evidence in this case included eyewitnesses, 
physical evidence, and expert testimony (Tr. at 668). 
Contrary to defendant's assertion, the prosecutor did 
not misstate the evidence about defendant's intoxication. The 
prosecutor correctly stated that the testimony of Apodaca, 
Anderson, Tilley, and Ms. Bentzley did not include that defendant 
was "staggering" or exhibited "slurred speech" (Tr. at 667). As 
defendant notes, Apodaca, in response to defense counsel's 
question whether defendant was "quite drunk" when he approached 
Apodaca, said that defendant did not "seem quite drunk" to the 
witness (Tr. at 103). In the context of Anderson's perception of 
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the dangerousness of defendant and the other assailants, defense 
counsel asked if he felt they were dangerous because they were 
drunk. Anderson responded that he "guess[ed] so" (Tr. at 136). 
When counsel asked if all four were "pretty drunk," Anderson 
answered, "My opinion, yes" (Tr. at 140). Tilley thought the 
defendants "had been drinking" (Tr. at 160). Later, defense 
counsel asked Tilley if the defendants were "quite drunk," and 
Tilley responded that he assumed that they had been drinking 
because they had drunk on the job before (Tr. at 173). Ms. 
Bentzley testified that defendant spoke "very clear[ly]" when she 
spoke on the radio with him at 9:00 p.m. (Tr. at 442-43). Just 
as the prosecutor stated, these witnesses had not testified that 
they had noticed "any staggering, slurred speech, anything like 
that" (Tr. at 667). The inference from the three on-site 
witnesses's testimony was that they thought that defendant had 
been drinking or may have been drunk but there was no testimony 
that defendant was not moving in a normal fashion. The 
prosecutor's statements were not a misstatement of the testimony. 
The statement that the defendant would prefer being 
convicted of something less than second degree murder came in the 
context of suggesting that the jury look at the murder jury 
instruction before contemplating the lesser offense instructions 
(Tr. at 661-62). Defendant cites a Pennsylvania case as 
analogous to this comment but does not demonstrate how this case 
makes the prosecutor's statement obvious error (Br. of App. at 
43). The jurors's common sense would tell them that a person 
would prefer to be convicted, if at all, on a lesser charge. The 
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prosecutor was merely stating the obvious, he was not disparaging 
a legitimate defense strategy. 
Defendant next cites two comments by the prosecutor 
which he states "were specifically calculated to cause jury 
prejudice and as a result, it is argued, they too constituted 
error" (Br. of App. at 43). No analysis of the impropriety of 
these remarks is presented and this Court should decline to 
address those comments. Amicone, 689 P.2d at 1344. 
Defendant maintains that the prosecutor vouched for the 
credibility of Anderson. A reading of the transcript cites 
provided in this point shows that the prosecutor's comments were 
in reference to consistency between the testimony of Anderson and 
the other evidence. Many of the citations do not have any 
reference to Anderson's testimony. Defendant has not shown that 
the prosecutor vouched for the credibility of Anderson. 
B. There is no reasonable likelihood of a different 
result had the prosecutor's statements been 
objected to and disregarded. 
Under either the plain error test or the prosecutorial 
misconduct test, defendant must show prejudice. Even if all of 
the statements defendant complains of w€>re improper, there simply 
is no reasonable likelihood that the improper remarks so 
prejudiced the jury that there would have been a more favorable 
result for defendant in their absence. There was substantial 
testimonial and physical evidence of defendant's guilt. See 
State v. Troy, 688 P.2d 483, 486 (Utah 1984) ("'If proof of 
defendant's guilt is strong, the challenged conduct or remark 
will not be presumed prejudicial'"). 
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The eyewitness testimony was that defendant joined in 
kicking and beating Ramirez outside the trailer; in fact/ 
defendant seemed to be directing the beating (Tr. at 116-21 and 
151-52). Defendant was heard threatening to beat and to kill 
Ramirez (Tr. at 119-21). Defendant testified that he struck the 
victim five or six times while they were in trailer #2 (Tr. at 
475-76). He claimed that he was chasing Apodaca and heard only 
"scuffling" when Ramirez was being beaten outside of the trailer 
(Tr. at 477-81). When next he saw Ramirez, Ramirez was on the 
ground, half conscious, and defendant tried to help him up (Tr. 
at 482-83). Someone else kicked Ramirez and defendant told them 
not to (Tr. at 483). Defendant did push down on Ramirez as he 
told the kicker to leave Ramirez alone, but then defendant helped 
Ramirez up and walked him to his trailer (Tr. at 483-84). In 
State v. Smith, 700 P.2d 1106 (Utah 1985), the Supreme Court 
faced a similar situation and said: 
As we have pointed out earlier, this 
record contains substantial evidence of 
defendant's guilt. His primary theory at 
trial appears to have been that someone else 
committed the crime . . . . The jury was free 
to accept or reject that theory in its 
entirety. Because the two options were so 
distinct, this is not a case where the 
evidence presented a close question or 
offered several possible constructions of 
ambiguous evidence. The possibility that the 
jury would be influenced by the prosecutor's 
reference to irrelevant factors in his 
closing statement was therefore greatly 
diminished. 
Id. at 1112. The jury was given two distinct options about 
defendant's involvement in Ramirez's death. As in Smith, the 
evidence was not ambiguous and the jury was not likely to have 
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been overly influenced by the prosecutor's closing statement. 
Defendant's final claim is that if none of the errors 
he alleges were reversible errors, their cumulative impact 
constituted reversible error. A similar argument was rejected in 
State v. Rammel, 721 P.2d 498, 501-502 (Utah 1986), when the 
supreme court held that the cumulative €>rror doctrine does not 
apply when no substantial errors were committed. As argued 
above, the errors claimed by defendant either were not errors at 
all or were not prejudicial; consequently, taken together they do 
not constitute cumulative reversible error. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT PREJUDICIAL 
ERROR BY THE TIMING OF ITS APPOINTMENT OF AN 
INVESTIGATOR OR BY DENYING DEFENDANT'S 
REQUEST FOR APPOINTMENT OF A PSYCHIATRIST TO 
ASSIST IN HIS DEFENSE. 
Defendant alleges that he was denied effective 
assistance of counsel, a fair trial, due process, or equal 
protection by the court (Br. of App. at 47). He addresses a 
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel as a separate point; 
that issue will also be addressed separately by the State. 
Defendant claims a general violation of his right to 
fair trial, due process, and equal protection under both the 
federal and state constitutions. He has not analyzed the claim 
separately under the state constitution; consequently, this Court 
should not review the claim as a separate state constitutional 
issue. See State v. Laffertv, 749 P.2d 1239, 1247 n.5 (Utah 
1988). Defendant has divided this issue into two subpoints; the 
first is that the trial court "belatedly" appointed an 
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first is that the trial court "belatedly" appointed an 
investigator for defendant. 
A. Appointment of an investigator. 
The second is that the trial court erred in not 
appointing a psychiatrist to assist in his defense. Defendant 
asserts that "belated" appointment of an investigator was a 
violation of his right to a fair trial and due process (Br. of 
App. at 49-50). The legislature has determined that 
[t]he following are minimum standards to be 
provided by each county, city and town for 
the defense of indigent persons in criminal 
cases in the courts and various 
administrative bodies of the state: 
(3) Provide the investigatory and other 
facilities necessary for a complete 
defense. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-32-1 (1990). The Utah Supreme Court 
explained the identical predecessor of this statute in Washington 
County v. Day, 22 Utah 2d 6, 447 P.2d 189 (1968). In that case, 
the court said: 
When counsel has once been appointed, he 
can petition the county to appoint an 
investigator; and in case of a refusal to 
act, counsel can then bring a writ of 
mandamus in court, and the court can after 
hearing the matter determine if an 
investigator should be appointed and can 
order the commissioners of the county to make 
an appointment. 
[However,] the law requiring an 
investigator as one of the minimum 
requirements does not contemplate an 
investigator unless there is some reasonable 
basis to justify an investigator spending 
time and incurring expenses. 
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(1972), the supreme court held that a denial of Cote's 
application for appointment of an investigator was not 
prejudicial to his rights. There was no showing that the 
information Cote thought an investigator would find would have 
aided in his defense. 
As indicated by the statutory provision for 
investigatory assistance and by the Day case, an investigator is 
not automatically appointed. Defendant must show a 
"particularized need" for an investigator. LaFave, Criminal 
Procedure, § 11.2(d) at 5 (Supp. 1990). "Establishing sufficient 
need for a special investigator appears to be especially 
difficult, perhaps because it is assumed that investigation of 
the facts is ordinarily within the expertise of counsel." 
LaFave, Criminal Procedure, § 11.2(d) at 26 (1984) (footnotes 
omitted). 
The record demonstrates that defendant made an oral 
motion on October 31, 1989, and filed a written motion for 
appointment of investigator in the circuit court on November 2, 
1989 (R. at 10 and 14-16). The county attorney filed a response, 
citing the Day and Cote cases, and alleging that defendant had 
failed to follow the procedure outlined in JDay in requesting the 
appointment (R. at 19-23). In a decision signed November 3, 
1989, the circuit judge determined that defendant had not 
complied with Day, and declined to appoint an investigator (R. at 
24). The next record mention of an investigator is on November 
20, 1989, with a clerk notation, "Trying for Private 
Investigator" (R. at 66). Defendant's preliminary hearing was 
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held December 19-22, 1989 (R. at 7 and 78-124). Nothing was 
noted in the record of the preliminary hearing about appointment 
of an investigator. 
Defendant was arraigned in the district court on 
January 2, 1990; again no mention of an investigator appears in 
the record (R. at 137). At a scheduling conference on January 
10, 1990, defendant was given until January 12, 1990, to file all 
motions (R. at 141). Also on January 10, defendant filed a 
motion for continuance; in the body of that motion, defendant 
refers to "the private investigator appointed in this matter" (R. 
at 147). In a response filed January 10 to the motion to 
continue, the deputy county attorney indicated that 
"investigators were appointed weeks ago" (R. at 152). Finally, 
on January 17, 1990, the court signed a written order appointing 
an investigator in this case; the court appointed the same 
investigator which had been appointed "in a related case" (R. at 
197). 
At a hearing on motions, held January 18, 1990, the 
deputy county attorney referred to a hearing held "several weeks 
before the arraignment . . . which was sort of an appeal from the 
circuit court, . . . where the defendants . . . said we need an 
investigator because we have witnesses we want to interview" 
(Transcript of Cabututan hearing 1/18/90 at 403). 
3
 Two hearings were held on January 18, 1990, one involving 
Cabututan and his counsel, Quinn Hunsaker. The second hearing 
involved defendant and his counsel, Jack Molgard. Mr. Molgard 
incorporated the arguments of Mr. Hunsaker and the court issued 
the same rulings in defendant's proceeding as had been issued in 
Cabututan's proceeding (Transcript of Cummins hearing 1/18/90 at 
10-24). 
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While the record does show the initial request for an 
investigator occurring on November 3, 19 89, and the written 
appointment being signed January 17, 1990, the actual length of 
time between the request and the appointment of an investigator 
apparently was shorter than that. If, as directed by the circuit 
court ruling on November 3, 1989, defendant approached the county 
for an investigator, the provision of that investigator may not 
appear in the record. From defendant's motion to continue, the 
State's response and the statements in the January 18 hearing, it 
appears that an investigator was provid€*d to all four defendants 
well before the district court signed the order for an 
investigator provided by Mr. Molgard. 
Even if the court had been remiss in timely appointing 
an investigator, defendant has not shown prejudice by the fashion 
in which the investigator was provided. See State v« Cote, 27 
Utah 2d 24, 492 P.2d 986, 987 (1972). Defendant alleges that 
there were discrepancies between the versions of the incident 
given by the eyewitnesses and defendant. Consequently, he 
maintains, "it was necessary to the preparation of an adequate 
defense that a private investigator be appointed to assist in 
interviewing the witnesses; to point out inconsistences to the 
witnesses, and attempt to decipher the truth prior to the 
preliminary hearing" (Br. of App. at 52). It is difficult to see 
how an investigator was "necessary" to point out inconsistencies 
between statements to the witnesses. Defense counsel was given 
the statements and was able to discern the inconsistencies. What 
would have been accomplished by pointing out the alleged 
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inconsistencies to the witnesses? How would an investigator have 
been any more capable of "decipher[ing] the truth prior to the 
preliminary hearing" than counsel? By pointing out the 
inconsistencies between the statements, would an investigator 
have been able to convince any of the witnesses to change their 
versions of the event? If he had, counsel would then have been 
free to impeach the witnesses with the change in their own 
statements in addition to using the inconsistencies between the 
statements of the different witnesses at trial. An investigator 
could have done no more than defense counsel could in finding the 
inconsistencies before trial; only counsel was in a position to 
use those inconsistencies at trial. 
Defendant argues that he should have been allowed to 
question the witnesses before preliminary hearing because after 
the testimony is given at that proceeding, it is "cast in stone" 
(Br. of App. at 52). He does not allege that he was denied 
access to the witnesses; nor does he indicate why the statements 
given by the witnesses before preliminary did not serve the same 
function of setting their versions in stone. 
Defendant next contends that an investigator could have 
taken photographs of the crime scene prior to the preliminary 
hearing to be shown to the witnesses to help them remember what 
they had seen (Br. of App. at 53). The exhibit list of the 
preliminary hearing demonstrates that photos of the scene were 
introduced into evidence and evidently were available for the 
purpose defendant cited for their use (R. at 125-33). Defendant 
-31-
does not indicate why these photographs were not sufficient for 
his purposes. 
Defendant also says he was restricted because his 
investigator did not obtain information regarding the victim's 
background and any violent nature of the victim or witnesses. He 
claims that this was necessary because defendant contends he was 
acting in self-defense; however, at trial, defendant never 
claimed that he acted in self-defense. Defendant testified that 
he hit Ramirez in the trailer when Ramirez's attention was drawn 
to Brown (Tr. at 475). Defendant said that he only heard 
scuffling when Ramirez was being beaten; defendant merely helped 
Ramirez up after the beating and helped him to his trailer (Tr. 
at 476-78 and 482-84). This defendant has never claimed that he 
struck Ramirez in self-defense; consequently, he did not need an 
investigator to bolster that defense. 
B. Appointment of a psychiatrist. 
Defendant maintains that he should have been allowed 
the assistance of a psychiatrist to determine whether he had the 
requisite mental state to be convicted of second degree murder. 
In point II, defendant argues this subpoint as a denial of due 
process and as a denial of the effective assistance of counsel. 
The assistance of counsel claim is raised again in point IV; the 
State will address that issue in the subsequent point. 
On January 16, 1990, defendant filed a motion to allow 
psychological testing and mental evaluation (R. at 185); a motion 
for appointment of court appointed experts, including a 
psychiatrist to determine defendant's capacity to form the 
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"necessary intent", a toxicologist to determine amount of 
marijuana in the victim's blood, an expert to determine the level 
of alcohol in defendant's blood, and a medical doctor to assist 
in evaluating the medical examiner's report (R. at 187-88); a 
notice of intent to claim lack of capacity to form intent (R. at 
189); and a motion to appoint psychiatrist and expert personnel 
to evaluate the effects of voluntary intoxication and alcoholism 
on the defendant's ability to "form the specific intent to 
commit" the crime (R. at 194). After written response from the 
State and argument on the matter in the Cabututan and Cummins 
hearings on January 18, the court denied the motions except for 
testimony relating to the level of intoxication and the effects 
thereof on defendant (R. at 235 and 239-40). The court 
determined that the motions were untimely but that there was good 
cause for allowing testimony of the level of intoxication (R. at 
239). 
Analysis of this issue involves an interplay of several 
statutes. Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-306 (1990) reads: 
Voluntary intoxication shall not be a 
defense to a criminal charge unless such 
intoxication negates the existence of the 
mental state which is an element of the 
offense[.] 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-14-3 (1990) states: 
(1) When a defendant proposes to offer 
. . . testimony of a mental health expert to 
establish mental state, he shall, at the time 
of arraignment or as soon afterward as 
practicable, but not fewer than 30 days 
before the trial, file and serve the 
prosecuting attorney with written notice of 
his intention to claim the defense. 
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Defendant filed a notice of intent to claim lack of 
capacity to form the requisite mental state on January 16, 1990 
(R. at 189). This was fourteen days after arraignment (R. at 
137), and twenty days before trial began (R. at 295). The trial 
court determined that this notice was untimely under Utah Code 
Ann. § 77-14-3. This factual determination is fully supported by 
the record in this matter and should not be disturbed. See State 
v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 (1987). 
Defendant argues that he should not "now be asked by 
the Court to pay the heavy price of waiver" because of his 
counsel's alleged lack of knowledge of the time requirements of 
the statute (Br. of App. at 57). This aspect of the issue and a 
harmless error analysis will be addressed in the subsequent 
argument concerning the effective assistance of counsel. 
POINT III 
THE COURT PROPERLY DENIED DEFENDANT'S MOTION 
FOR CONTINUANCE. 
Regarding a motion to continue trial, the Utah Supreme 
Court has said: 
It is well established in Utah, as 
elsewhere, that the granting of a continuance 
is at the discretion of the trial judge, 
whose decision will not be reversed by this 
Court absent a clear abuse of that 
discretion. State v. Moosman, Utah, 542 P.2d 
1093 (1975). Abuse may be found where a 
party has made timely objections, given 
necessary notice and made a reasonable effort 
to have the trial date reset for good cause. 
Griffiths v. Hammon, Utah, 560 P.2d 1375 
(1977). 
State v. Creviston, 646 P.2d 750, 752 (Utah 1982). "A serious 
lack of preparation might, in some circumstances, have such a 
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disadvantageous effect on a defendant's representation as to rise 
to a constitutional violation." State v. Pursifell. 746 P.2d 
270, 274 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). While a denial of a motion to 
continue trial to allow more time for preparation may rise to the 
level of a violation of the constitutional right to the effective 
assistance of counsel, Heffernan v. Lockhart, 834 F%2d 1431, 1437 
(8th Cir. 1987), denial of the motion is not a per se violation. 
In a concurring opinion in State v. Gonzales, 641 P,2d 146 (Utah 
1982), Justice Howe said: 
denial of defendant's motion for a 
continuance did not prohibit him from having 
effective assistance of counsel. The 
granting of a continuance is within the sound 
discretion of the trial court. State v. 
Moosman, Utah, 542 P.2d 1093 (1975). . .
 % 
Defense counsel prepared five motions within 
a week of his appointment. He filed a motion 
for a bill of particulars on the same day he 
entered an appearance, nine days before 
trial. 
Id. at 147-48 (Howe, J., concurring). Although Gonzales's 
counsel entered an appearance only nine days before trial, the 
supreme court determined that the record did not demonstrate that 
counsel was ineffective or unprepared. Id. 
Defendant's counsel filed a motion to continue his 
trial on January 10, 1990 (R. at 146-48), eight days after 
defendant was arraigned (R. at 137), and twenty-fiv§ days before 
trial (R. at 295). Counsel had been appointed on the day charges 
were filed, October 27, 1989 (R. at 8), and continued as counsel 
through trial (R. at 298). In the motion to continue, counsel 
complained that there was insufficient time to review all of the 
evidence, review the preliminary hearing transcript, interview 
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remaining witnesses, allow the investigator to "insure that 
weather conditions are appropriately similar to the conditions 
existing at the time of the claimed incident," analyze non-
specified fingerprint evidence, and consult with an unnamed 
psychiatric expert (R. at 146-48). The State filed a response on 
January 10, claiming that much of the evidence which counsel said 
he needed to review had been available to counsel since 
defendant's arrest in October 1989. The trials had been set in a 
speedy fashion in order to protect the evidence which would come 
from eyewitnesses who were transient in the area. The tape 
recording of the preliminary hearing had been available to 
counsel since the time of the hearing and the transcript was 
being provided to counsel on January 10 or 11. Witnesses had 
been available since October for interviewing by counsel or his 
investigator. Waiting for similar weather conditions for 
investigation was a "truly novel" idea. No indication of the 
nature or importance of fingerprint evidence was given. Finally, 
counsel had known of the involvement of alcohol since the 
beginning of the case; ample time existed for counsel to have 
consulted, or still to consult, with a psychiatric expert (R. at 
149-53) . 
The court denied the motion on January 11, finding that 
counsel had had full access to the county attorney's files, there 
had been an extensive preliminary hearing at which counsel had 
been able to cross-examine all of the witnesses at length, the 
transient nature of the witnesses dictated a speedy trial 
setting, and defendant was in custody (R. at 156-57). This 
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denial was not an abuse of discretion. Counsel had had from 
October 27, 1989, to January 11, 1990, to conduct the review and 
investigation that he thought crucial. He also had the remaining 
twenty-five days until trial to continue to prepare. All of the 
preparations included in defendant's motion to continue, or in 
his brief on appeal, could have been accomplished in the time 
between the charging of the crime and the trial. The trial court 
no doubt was aware of this when it denied the motion; that denial 
was not an abuse of discretion. 
POINT IV 
TRIAL COUNSEL DID NOT PROVIDE INEFFECTIVE 
ASSISTANCE TO DEFENDANT. 
Defendant contends that his trial counsel provided 
ineffective assistance on four bases: 1) Counsel failed to file 
a timely motion for psychiatric assistance; 2) counsel failed to 
adequately prepare; 3) counsel failed to call character 
witnesses; and 4) counsel failed to object to prosecutorial 
errors. 
This Court addressed the issue of effective assistance 
of counsel in State v. Pursifell, 746 P.2d 270 (Utah Ct. App. 
1987), in which it said: 
In Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 
. . . (1984), the United States Supreme Court 
established the standard for determining 
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel 
at trial. To prevail, the defendant must 
demonstrate, first, that counsel's 
representation fell below an objective 
standard of reasonable professional judgment, 
and second, that counsel's performance 
prejudiced the defendant. Id,, at 690 . . . . 
The Utah Supreme Court has adopted and 
interpreted the Strickland standard for 
determining ineffective assistance claims. 
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See, e.g., State v. Frame, 723 P.2d 401 (Utah 
1986). 
746 P.2d at 275 (parallel citations omitted). Interpreting the 
test from Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), the Utah 
Supreme Court said: 
Defendant must prove that specific, 
identified acts or omissions fall outside the 
wide range of professionally competent 
assistance. 
Furthermore, any deficiency must be 
prejudicial to defendant. . . . To be found 
sufficiently prejudicial, defendant must 
affirmatively show that a "reasonable 
probability" exists that, but for counsel's 
error, the result would have been different. 
We have defined "reasonable probability" as 
that sufficient to undermine confidence in 
the reliability of the verdict. 
State v. Frame, 723 P.2d 401, 405 (Utah 1986) (footnote omitted). 
This Court "'need not determine whether counsel's performance was 
deficient before examining the prejudice suffered by defendant as 
a result of the alleged deficiencies. . . . If it is easier to 
dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of 
sufficient prejudice, which we expect will often be so, that 
course should be followed.'" Jd. (quoting Strickland, 446 U.S. 
at 697). Applying this test to the present case, defendant has 
not demonstrated that he was prejudiced by his counsel's 
performance. 
A. Motion for appointment of a psychiatrist. 
Defendant first claims that his counsel was deficient 
because he failed to file a timely motion for psychiatric 
assistance. The record demonstrates that there was no reasonable 
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probability of a different result at trial had counsel filed a 
timely motion and a psychiatrist been appointed. While there was 
testimony of the amount defendant had allegedly had to drink, the 
defense, based on his own testimony, was that he had not 
participated in the beating, not that he had not had the 
requisite mental state to commit the crime. Defendant testified 
to punching Ramirez five or six times while they were in the 
trailer (Tr. at 475-76). When Ramirez was being beaten outside 
the trailer, defendant claims to have been inside trying to get 
Cayer out of the trailer and then to have been chasing Apodaca 
(Tr. at 477-81). His next contact with Ramirez was when he tried 
to help him up, keep others from kicking Ramirez, and then 
helping Ramirez to his trailer (Tr. at 483-84). From his own 
testimony, his defense was that he did not participate in the 
severe beating which lead to Ramirez's death. In State v. 
Padilla, 776 P.2d 1329 (Utah 1989), the Utah Supreme Court 
applied harmless error analysis to Padilla's claim that the trial 
court's voluntary intoxication instruction was faulty. .Ici. at 
1331-32. The court found that Padilla had not relied on an 
intoxication defense as the theory of his case. Padilla claimed 
at trial that the shooting was accidental; consequently, his 
inability to form the requisite mental state was not at issue. 
In the present case, as in Padilla. defendant presented evidence 
that he had been drinking; however, his own testimony was that he 
had not participated in the beating and kicking. Defendant's 
defense was that he did not cause the death, not that he did not 
have the requisite mental state. A psychiatrist would not have 
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assisted defendant in presenting this defense. 
While in the present case there is evidence that 
defendant had consumed alcohol, he does not claim that he 
"blacked out" or lacks memory of the attack on Ramirez. In 
Padilla, eyewitnesses to Padilla's crime had testified that he 
was not incapacitated. Padilla "himself testified in detail 
about the events leading up to the incident, but claimed to have 
lost his memory regarding the shooting itself." .Id., at 1332. 
The court said, "This evidence all tends to negate defendant's 
position that he was so intoxicated that he 'blacked out' before 
and during the time of the shooting." Id. 
In State v. Wood, 648 P.2d 71 (Utah 1982), the supreme 
court addressed an intoxication defense, stating that, "for Wood 
to have been successful, he had to prove much more than he had 
been drinking. It was necessary to show that his mind had been 
affected to such an extent that he did not have the capacity to 
form the requisite [mental state.]" .Id. at 90. As in Padilla, 
neither Wood nor an eyewitness testified that Wood's "faculties 
were impaired" .Id. Nothing in the present case points to a 
finding that defendant was so intoxicated that he could not have 
formed the requisite mental state. The eyewitnesses presumed 
that defendant was drunk but they did not testify that defendant 
had any trouble moving about or participating in the beating. 
Defendant shows a clear recollection of his version of what 
occurred, which attempts to minimize his own participation, but 
which does not show that defendant was not aware of what he was 
doing. Defendant was seen directing the beating administered to 
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Ramirez (Tr. at 151-52); he was also seen beating, kicking and 
choking Ramirez in conjunction with the other three (Tr. at 116). 
Several times during the beating, defendant was heard threatening 
to beat and to kill Ramirez (Tr. at 119 and 121). The inferences 
from the evidence is that defendant knowingly and intentionally 
struck Ramirez, intending to cause serious bodily injury, and 
committing acts clearly dangerous to human life, or acted with 
depraved indifference to Ramirez's life as he participated in the 
beating. Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203 (Supp. 1990). A psychiatrist 
could only have testified from the information presented to him 
or her. From the evidence produced at trial, there was little 
evidence that a psychiatrist could have used to determine that 
defendant did not have a culpable mental state. The evidence of 
the amount of alcohol consumed came only from defendant himself 
and did not comport with the evidence of defendant's lack of 
impairment. The testimony of the eyewitnesses and defendant 
himself shows that defendant was not impaired to the point of 
negating the requisite mental state. Since the evidence did not 
support a finding that defendant had been intoxicated to the 
extent of negating his mental state, a psychiatrist could not 
have assisted in establishing that defense. 
B. Adequate preparation and cross-examination. 
Defendant next contends that trial counsel did not 
adequately prepare for trial, which inadequate preparation caused 
him to be deficient in cross-examining the eyewitnesses. 
Defendant has failed to provide an adequate record to allow this 
Court to address these issues. 
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To affirm a reversal of his conviction, 
[defendant] must show prejudicial error. 
State v. Jones, Utah, 657 P.2d 1263, 1267 
(1982). Since the record is silent as to why 
the motion [] was denied, "we do not presume 
either error or prejudice." State v. 
Hamilton, 18 Utah 2d 234, 239, 419 P.2d 770, 
773 (1966). . . . 
Since [defendant] has not supplied a trial 
transcript on appeal, we are unable to 
determine whether [defendant] was [prejudiced 
by denial of his motion.] Since there is no 
record evidence showing that [defendant] was 
prejudiced by a lack of a bill of 
particulars, we must assume the regularity of 
the proceedings below and affirm the 
judgment. 
State v. Robbins, 709 P.2d 771, 773 (Utah 1985). Defendant has 
not provided a record for his claims that trial counsel failed to 
interview witnesses prior to preliminary hearing, to obtain 
photographic evidence of the crime scene, to obtain background 
information of the victim, and to review the preliminary hearing 
transcript and statements of witnesses. Because defendant has 
not carried his burden of proving specific omissions, this Court 
should presume "that counsel rendered adequate assistance and 
exercised 'reasonable professional judgment.'" Frame, 723 P.2d 
at 405 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690). 
Defendant cites to several instances of alleged 
discrepancies between the eyewitnesses' trial testimony and their 
pretrial statements and testimony at the preliminary hearing. 
Defendant has not provided the preliminary hearing transcript or 
the pretrial statements to allow this Court to review the 
allegations. This Court should presume regularity and decline to 
address these claims. State v. Robbins, 709 P.2d 771, 773 (Utah 
1985). 
•42-
Even if the actions or omissions of trial counsel which 
defendant challenges were deficient, he has not demonstrated that 
he was prejudiced by counsel's performance. The discrepancies 
defendant lists in his brief were minor differences which usually 
can be explained by the differences in perception between 
different witnesses with different vantage points. Apodaca saw 
little of the beating before defendant chased him away (Tr. at 
96-98). Tilley saw only ten to fifteen seconds of the beating 
(Tr. at 160). Anderson saw the most, although even he saw only 
three-quarters of the fight (Tr. at 133). The discrepancies 
defendant points to are consistent with witnesses who saw 
different angles and different parts of a single event. Even if 
counsel had pointed out the discrepancies, there is no reasonable 
probability that the jury would have returned a different 
verdict. See State v. Wvnia, 754 P.2d 667, 671-72 (Utah Ct. 
App.), cert, denied, 765 P.2d 1278 (1988). 
C. Calling character witnesses. 
Defendant claims ineffective assistance of counsel 
because trial counsel did not call character witnesses "despite 
the obvious need for character testimony" (Br. of App. at 72). 
He claims that he requested that counsel call character 
witnesses, but there is no record of such a request. Neither 
does defendant allege how calling character witnesses would have 
resulted in a different verdict at trial. His failure to 
demonstrate prejudice by counsel not calling character witnesses 
nullifies his claim. See Frame, 723 P.2d at 405. 
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D. Objection to alleged prosecutorial errors. 
Defendant again fails to demonstrate prejudice in his 
claim that trial counsel failed to object to prosecutorial 
errors. "It is not enough to claim that the alleged errors had 
some conceivable effect of the outcome or could have had a 
prejudicial effect of the fact finders. To be found sufficiently 
prejudicial, defendant must affirmatively show that a 'reasonable 
probability' exists that, but for counsel's error, the result 
would have been different." 1^. Defendant's conclusory 
assertions that his counsel was deficient and "prejudiced the 
trial to such as extent that the verdict cannot be relied upon," 
does not affirmatively show how his trial was prejudiced by 
counsel's failure to object. Failure to demonstrate prejudice 
negates defendant's claim that trial counsel provided ineffective 
assistance. 
POINT V 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY RESPONDED TO THE 
QUESTIONS POSED BY THE JURY DURING ITS 
DELIBERATIONS. 
Defendant maintains that the trial court failed to 
provide the guidance that the jury sought when it sent out notes 
during its deliberation. The record shows that trial counsel did 
not object to the manner in which the court handled the questions 
which the jury posed (Tr. at 671-75). Trial counsel even 
participated in fashioning a response to the questions which 
provided the statutory definition of "serious bodily injury" (Tr. 
at 672-75 and R. at 300). 
"A general rule of appellate review in 
criminal cases in Utah is that a 
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contemporaneous objection or some form of 
specific preservation of claims of error must 
be made a part of the trial court record 
before an appellate court will review such 
claim on appeal." 
State v. Johnson, 774 P.2d 1141, 1144 (Utah 1989) (emphasis in 
original) (quoting State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 551 (Utah 
1987)). Defendant's failure to object to the manner in which the 
court responded to the jury's questions waives appellate review 
of this issue. 
Even if this issue had been preserved for review, 
defendant's claim is without merit. See State v. Couch, 635 P.2d 
89, 93, n.5 (Utah 1981). The record demonstrates that the trial 
court did respond to the jury's questions with more than a 
"terse[] directfion to the jury] to reread the instructions 
already given" (Br. of App. at 74). The trial court worked with 
counsel to prepare a response to the jury which was then given to 
the jury in written form (Tr. at 671-75 and R. at 300). As to 
other questions which were asked by the jury, the trial court 
properly referred the jury back to the instructions which 
answered their questions. 
In State v. Couch, 635 P.2d 89 (Utah 1981), the supreme 
court remanded the case because the trial judge refused to define 
the word "genitals" for the jury. The court noted that the law 
regarding responses to jury requests had been changed; however, 
that case presented a circumstance "in which, even under the 
current statute, the court should 'respond to the inquiry.'" Id. 
at 94, n.9. The provision regarding jury questions is now found 
in rule 17(m), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, which reads: 
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After the jury has retired for 
deliberation, if they desire to be informed 
on any point of law arising in the cause, 
they shall inform the officer in charge of 
them, who shall communicate such request to 
the court. The court may then direct that 
the jury be brought before the court where, 
in the presence of the defendant and both 
counsel, the court shall respond to the 
inquiry or advise the jury that no further 
instructions shall be given. Such response 
shall be recorded. The court may in its 
discretion respond to the inquiry in writing 
without having the jury brought before the 
court, in which case the inquiry and the 
response thereto shall be entered in the 
record. 
In Couch, the supreme court drew from the United States Supreme 
Court when it stated: 
"Discharge of the jury's responsibility for 
drawing appropriate conclusions from the 
testimony depended on discharge of the 
judge's responsibility to give the jury the 
required guidance by a lucid statement of the 
relevant legal criteria- When a jury makes 
explicit its difficulties a trial judge 
should clear them away with concrete 
accuracy." 
Id. at 94 (quoting Bollenbach v. United States, 326 U.S. 607, 
612-13 (1946) (emphasis added in Couch)). The trial judge must 
provide guidance through its instructions on the law. If the 
original instructions provide that guidance, the court may 
properly decline to give supplemental instructions. 
In Couch, the word about which the jury had a question 
was a word "susceptible of differing interpretations, only one of 
which is a proper statement of the law"; in that circumstance, an 
additional instruction was required. Couch, 635 P.2d at 94. 
Further review of the instructions already given could not have 
assisted that jury in arriving at the correct legal 
-46-
interpretation of the word. In the present case, the words about 
which the jury had question could be answered by further review 
of the original instructions. The first note referred to 
Instruction #15 and asked, "The concluding words 'cause the 
result', does 'result' mean death or bodily injury or what?" (R. 
between [the notes are unnumbered] 298-99). Instruction #15 
defines culpable mental states using the language of the statute, 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-103 (1990). The judge's response was to 
refer the jury to the "language of the charge [they were] 
considering" (R. between 298-99). The jury had been instructed 
on the charged offense of second degree murder (R. at 317 and 
320-21), on the lesser included offense of manslaughter (R. at 
326-27), on negligent homicide (R. at 328), on aggravated assault 
(R. at 329-20), and assault (R. at 331). These different 
offenses have different culpable mental states. The court 
properly referred the jury to the language of whichever offense 
they were considering to determine which mental state applied; 
from that, they could determine the meaning of the word "result" 
in Instruction #15. Given the plethora of offenses the jury was 
considering, the court could not be more specific in defining 
"result" for the jury. He could properly refer them to whichever 
specific offense instruction they were considering in order to 
determine the correct definition of the word in the context of 
that offense. 
The second note asked, "Do you have to intend to kill 
someone to be convicted of second degree murder?" The court 
referred the jury to the culpable mental state described in 
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Instruction #2 (R. between 298-99). That instruction told the 
jury that the culpable mental states were either "intending to 
cause serious bodily injury to Miguel Ramirez, . . . or acting 
under circumstances evidencing a depraved indifference to human 
life" (R. at 317). The court's response answered the jury's 
question as to the requisite mental state to convict this 
defendant of second degree murder. It was in response to this 
question that defense counsel asked for and received the 
supplemental instruction defining "serious bodily injury" (Tr. at 
671-75 and R. at 300) . 
The final question referred to the elements instruction 
(R. at 320-21), and asked in apparently geometric terms about the 
interplay between the subparagraphs of the instruction (R. 
between 298-99). The jury appeared to be trying to read the 
instruction as an equation in which certain subparagraphs added 
up to equal another subparagraph. The jury's attempt to read the 
instruction as an equation could not be answered other than to 
ask the jury to consider the basic instructions as the>y had been 
given them (R. at 299). The court could not tell the jury that 
they were reading too much into the instruction, it could only 
ask them to look at the instruction again. 
The trial court did not ignore the jury's requests for 
guidance; instead, the court gave the guidance which it could 
properly give. There is no error in the manner in which the 
court responded to the jury's questions. 
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POINT VI 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION 
IN THE MANNER IN WHICH IT ALLOWED THE JURY TO 
DELIBERATE. 
Defendant next contends that the trial court abused its 
discretion by allowing the jury to deliberate until 1:20 a.m. 
after four days of trial (Br. of App. at 76). This Court, in 
State v. Lactod, 761 P.2d 23 (Utah Ct. App. 1988), stated: 
While it is well-established that the length 
of time a jury may be kept together for 
deliberation is discretionary with the trial 
judge, he may not coerce the jury into 
returning a verdict because this amounts to a 
denial of a fair and impartial jury trial and 
is therefore, a denial of due process. 
Id. at 31 (citing Mills v. Tinslev, 314 F.2d 311, 313 (10th 
Cir.), cert, denied, 374 U.S. 847 (1963)). The trial court may 
keep a jury together for deliberation as long as the length of 
time does not become coercive. There is not, as defendant seeks, 
a specific time limit beyond which the length is automatically 
coercive and automatically a denial of due process. 
Whether the trial court abuses its discretion by 
allowing continued deliberation is based on the facts of a given 
case. In the case cited by defendant, Isom v. State, 481 So.2d 
820 (Miss. 1985), the jury had deliberated for over seven hours 
when they asked the court to allow them to retire for the 
evening. The court required them to return to deliberation, then 
called them back into court to instruct them that they must reach 
a decision. These facts made the length of deliberation 
coercive, not the mere fact of the amount of time which had 
passed. 
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In the present case, the jury retired to deliberate on 
the fourth day of trial (R. at 294 and Tr. at 669). The record 
demonstrates that the jury sent three notes to the court for 
clarification of the instructions (R. between 298-99 and Tr. at 
671-75). There is nothing in the record regarding any request by 
the jury to retire from deliberation. There is no hint of 
coercion by the court to force the jury to continue deliberations 
beyond a request to cease. Defendant has not and cannot point to 
any record support for an assertion that the court coerced the 
jury into reaching a decision by prolonging their deliberation. 
Defendant asks this Court to presume that the length of 
time must have caused the jury to be less alert, and to assume 
that some jurors were forced to continue by others who "wanted to 
get the job over and done with at the expense of the Appellant" 
(Br, of App. at 76). Nothing in the record supports these 
conclusions; in fact, the opposite is demonstrated by the record. 
The notes sent to the court by the jury during deliberation are 
evidence that the jurors were giving careful thought to the 
evidence and instructions which they had been given. The jurors 
were polled as to whether the verdict was each of theirs 
individually and they answered in the affirmative (Tr. at 675-
76). Defendant received his constitutional right to the 
"considered judgment of each juror" (Br. of App. at 76). 
POINT VII 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING TO 
ALLOW THE JURY TO VIEW THE CRIME SCENE. 
Defendant argues that the court erred in refusing to 
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let the jury view the scene of the crime/ Once again, 
defendant's claim lacks merit. 
Rule 17(i), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, provides 
the guideline for permitting a jury to visit a crime scene: 
When in the opinion of the court it is 
proper for the jury to view the place in 
which the offense is alleged to have been 
committed, or in which any other material 
fact occurred, it may order them to be 
conducted in a body under the charge of an 
officer to the place, which shall be shown to 
them by some person appointed by the court 
for that purpose. The officer shall be sworn 
that while the jury are thus conducted, he 
will suffer no person other than the person 
so appointed to speak to them nor to do so 
himself on any subject connected with the 
trial and to return them into court without 
unnecessary delay or at a specified time. 
The decision to allow jurors to view a crime scene lies in the 
sound discretion of the trial court and will not be overturned 
unless the trial court "palpably" abuses its discretion. See 
State v. Roedl, 107 Utah 538, 155 P.2d 741, 746 (1945). Other 
states have adopted a similar standard. State v. Maurof 159 
Ariz. 186, 766 P.2d 59, 77 (1986); People v. Cisneros, 720 P.2d 
982, 984 (Colo. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 887 (1986); 
State v. Stoudamire, 30 Wash. App. 41, 631 P.2d 1028, 1031 
(1981). 
In the instant case, defendant has not demonstrated how 
he was prejudiced by the lower court's refusal to allow the jury 
to visit the crime scene. He merely concludes that the evidence 
is weak and that viewing the scene would have helped the jury 
A
 Since defendant provides no legal analysis or authority 
for his claim, this Court may refuse to consider the issue. 
State v. Amicone, 689 P.2d 1341, 1344 (Utah 1984). 
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POINT VIII 
THE DOCTRINE OF CUMULATIVE ERROR DOES NOT 
APPLY TO THIS MATTER EECAUSE THE CLAIMS 
RAISED BY DEFENDANT EITHER WERE NOT ERROR OR 
WERE NOT PREJUDICIAL. 
Defendant's final point is that if none of the errors 
he alleges were reversible errors, their cumulative impact 
constituted reversible error. A similar argument was rejected in 
State v. Rammel, 721 P.2d 498, 501-502 (Utah 1986), when the 
supreme court held that the cumulative error doctrine does not 
apply when no substantial errors were committed. As argued 
above, the errors claimed by defendant either were not errors at 
all or were not prejudicial; consequently, taken together they do 
not constitute cumulative reversible error. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, the State respectfully requests 
that this Court affirm defendant's conviction and sentence. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this 3- day of April, 1991. 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Attorney General 
CHARLENE BARLOW 
Assistant Attorney General 
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